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LEARY v. THE QUEEN
By ALAN D. GOLD*
In Leary v. The Queen,' the Supreme Court of Canada by a six to three
majority decided: (1) the law respecting the "defence" of drunkenness as
laid down in D.P.P. v. Beard2 remains essentially correct;3 (2) crimes may
be distinguished into categories of specific and general intent, the distinction
between these categories being correctly defined in the earlier Supreme Court
decision of R. v. George;4 (3) drunkenness is no defence to crimes of general
intent; (4) rape is a crime of general intent to which drunkenness is no de-
fence; (5) in any event, there was no evidence that Leary was drunk to such
a degree as to be incapable of forming the intent to commit rape; and (6)
even if there was some evidence to this effect, there was no miscarriage of justice.
Dickson J., dissenting (with Laskin C.J.C. and Spence J. concurring),
held: (1) Beard should no longer be recognized as good law; (2) no intelli-
gible distinction can be drawn between crimes of "specific" and "general" in-
tent, and the "fiction" should be discarded; (3) in any criminal charge requir-
ing proof of mens rea, evidence of drunkenness is to be considered by the jury,
together with all other relevant evidence, in determining whether the prosecu-
tion has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the mens rea required to constitute
the crime; (4) the instruction to the jury that "drunkenness was not a defence
to this charge [of rape]" was in error; (5) there was evidence that Leary was
intoxicated; and (6) it cannot be said that a properly charged jury would have
inevitably convicted, thus a new trial should be ordered.
The majority judgment finally resolved the previous conflict between the
British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Boucher5 and the Ontario
Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Vandervoort;6 the former holding equivalent
to that of Leary, while the latter held rape to be a crime of specific intent to
which drunkenness could be a defence.
The majority judgment was much influenced by the recent decision of
the House of Lords in D.P.P. v. Majewski,7 which affirmed the traditional
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3 See A. Gold, An Untrimmed Beard: The Law of Intoxication as a Defence to a
Criminal Charge (1977), 19 Crim. L.Q. 34 at 35-36.
4 R. v. George, [1960] S.C.R. 871, 128 C.C.C. 289.
5 R. v. Boucher (1963), 40 W.W.R. 663, [1963] 2 C.C.C. 241 (B.C.C.A.).
O R. v. Vandervoort, [1961] O.W.N. 141, 130 C.C.C. 158 (H.C.).
7 D.P.P. v. Majewski, [1976] 2 W.L.R. 623, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142 (H.L.).
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statement of the law according to Beard, notwithstanding the growing chorus
of criticism of that decision.8
The criticism of Majewski (and Beard) was based on logical grounds,
which the Law Lords felt had to give way to certain policy considerations:
Acceptance generally of intoxication as a defence . ..would ...undermine the
criminal law .. 9
One of the prime purposes of the criminal law, with its penal sanctions, is the
protection from certain proscribed conduct of persons who are pursuing their
lawful lives. Unprovoked violence has, from time immemorial, been a significant
part of such proscribed conduct. To accede to the argument on behalf of the
appellant would leave the citizen legally unprotected from unprovoked violence,
where such violence was the consequence of drink or drugs having obliterated the
capacity of the perpetrator to know what he was doing or what were its
consequences. 10
It was... submissions of this startling character which led my noble and learned
friend, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, to comment trenchantly to appellant's counsel:
'It is all right to say "Let justice be done though the heavens fall". But you ask
us to say, "Let logic be done even though public order be threatened", which is
something very different.'
Are the claims of logic, then, so compelling that a man behaving as the Crown
witnesses testified the appellant did must be cleared of criminal responsibility?
If such be the inescapable result of the strict application of logic in this branch
of the law, it is indeed not surprising that illogicality has long reigned, and the
prospect of its dethronement must be regarded as alarming.11
The logical criticism centered on the validity of the concept of "specific
intent," which was thought to be central to the Beard rules. As one commen-
tator put it:
• ..the rule [to be] deduced from Beard ...[is] that evidence of self-induced
intoxication negativing mens rea is a defence to a charge of [a] crime requiring proof
of a "specific intent" but not to a charge of any other crime. In the case of a
crime not requiring a "specific intent" D may be convicted, if he was voluntarily
intoxicated at the time of committing the offence, though he did not have the
mens rea required for that offence in all other circumstances, and even though
he was in a state of automatism at the time of doing the "act".
• ..The House recognize[d], as a rule of substantive law that, where voluntary
intoxication is relied on in a charge of crime not requiring a "specific intent," the
prosecution need not prove any intention or foresight, whatever the definition
of the crime may say ...12
Another commentator's criticism of the specific-general intent distinction
was even harsher:
"Specific intent" seems to be a meaningless expression and it is a discredit to
English law that it should continue to be used in determining issues so important
as those dealt with in serious criminal cases. Is it too much to hope that the
8 Gold, supra note 3. See also G. Orchard, Drunkenness as a "Defence" to Crime
(1977), 1 Crim. LI. 59 at 132; and A. Dashwood, Logic and the Lords in Maewski,
[1977] Crim. L. Rev. 532 at 591.
9 D.P.P. v. Majewski, supra note 7, at 634 (W.L.R.), 151 (All E.R.) per Lord
Elwyon-Jones L.C.
3001d. at 635 (W.L.R.), 152 (All E.R.) per Lord Simon of Glaisdale.
1 Id. at 651 (W.L.R.), 168 (All E.R.) per Lord Edmund-Davies.
32 J. Smith, Case and Comment, [1976] Crim. L. Rev. 374 at 375.
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judges in the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords will put aside the meaning-
less verbiage and go back to first principles?
These principles make no distinction between offences requiring "specific intent"
and offences not requiring that mysterious ingredient. It is submitted that such a
distinction has no proper place in the law.13
The majority in Leary14 take as the distinction the formulation in R. v.
George, where Fauteux J. said:
In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be made between
(i) intention as applied to acts considered in relation to their purposes and (ii) in-
tention as applied to acts considered apart from their purposes. A general intent
attending the commission of an act is, in some cases, the only intent required
to constitute the crime while, in others, there must be, in addition to that general
intent, a specific intent attending the purpose for the commission of the act.
It is pointed out that in Majewski, "Lord Simon of Glaisdale said of...
Fauteux J.'s judgment in George, that it was 'the best description of specific
intent in this sense that I know.' None of the other Law Lords sitting differed."'15
Lord Simon interpreted Fauteux J.'s statement to mean: "The mens rea in a
crime of specific intent requires proof of a purposive element."' 16
The George formulation has been criticized, however, in terms especially
apposite to the Leary case, on the basis that it contradicts established pre-
cedent:
There is no real purposive element in the mens rea of murder.
[It] ought not to be a crime of specific intent if the purpose test were applied.
On the other hand, Lord Simon holds that rape is not a crime of specific intent
yet rape does require a purposive element-it is difficult to imagine a case of rape
where D does not have the purpose of having intercourse with a woman (though
he may be merely indifferent whether she consents or not). Taking a conveyance
without the consent of the owner similarly requires an element of purpose but
it is not such a crime of "specific intent." The purpose test, with respect, does not
fit the established law. 17
Attempted murder and murder are consistently characterized as specific
intent offences. Another commentator points out,' 8 even "though the S.C.C.
has recognized reckless attempts to murder: Lajoie v. The Queen,10 . . .
it is clear on statutory construction that by no means all types of murder
require specific intent to kill." Ironically, the George formulation of specific
intent is criticized by Glanville Williams in a book cited by Pigeon J. with
approval. 20
13 J. Smith, Case and Comment, [1975] Crim. L. Rev. 155 at 157-58.
14Leary v. The Queen, supra note 1, at 50 (S.C.R.), 106-07 (D.L.R.), 476-77
(C.C.C.).
15 Id. at 52 (S.C.R.), 108 (D.L.R.), 478 (C.C.C.).
16 D.P.P.v. Majewski, supra note 7, at 638 (W.L.R.), 155 (All E.R.).
17 Smith, supra note 12, at 377-78.
18 D. Stuart, Annual Survey of Canadian Law-Part 3: Criminal Law and Proce-
dure (1977), 9 Ottawa L. Rev. 568 at 605.
19 Laioie v. The Queen (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 313 (S.C.C.).
20 G. Williams, The Mental Element in Crime (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The
Hebrew University, 1965) at 44-47. In Leary v. The Queen, supra note 1, at 60 (S.C.R.),
113 (D.L.R.), 483 (C.C.C.), Pigeon J. cites to 47. See text accompanying notes 23
and 24, infra.
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There is no illustration in Leary of the actual application of the George
rule which might contribute to a better understanding of it. The first part of
the majority judgment in Leary is concerned with the distinction between
crimes of specific intent and general intent, and the George rule is discussed
at length. In the next section of the judgment, in which the issue of the nature
of the offence of rape is discussed, one would expect the George rule to be
applied. Surprisingly, no attempt to analyse rape in terms of the George rule
is made. Rather, the conclusion that rape is a crime of general intent is simply
stated to be self-evident despite a review of authorities reaching different de-
cisions on the issue.2 1
A proper analysis of the mens rea of rape has been suggested by various
commentators.2 2 As Glanville Williams puts it:2
... it is clear on principle that if the defendant believes that he has the woman's
consent, though in fact he has not, he does not have the mens rea required for
the crime. It is equally clear on principle that drunkenness is a factor to be
considered in judging whether a defence of belief in the woman's consent is to
be credited. While these abstract propositions of law seem to be unassailable,
certain countervailing considerations are of weight. In the first place, one finds it
hard to imagine an actual situation in which a defendant is sober enough to have
sexual intercourse with a struggling and protesting woman and yet too drunk to
realize that she is struggling and protesting. In the second place, to leave this
unreal issue to the jury in every case of drunken rape would increase the possibil-
ity of confusion and of unmeritorious acquittals. Notwithstanding these practical
considerations, the theoretical legal point was accepted by the Supreme Court of
Victoria. Canadian courts have not been unanimous...
After referring to Boucher, Professor Williams continues:
In any case, the argument advanced for the appellant could not convincingly
be rejected merely by speaking of general and specific intent. The argument is
related to the question of belief in consent, and should have been considered in
those terms. (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing so accurately summarizes the opposing views of logic and
policy, and so clearly points out the necessity to discard the language of spe-
cific and general intent in deciding the issue, that one may well be surprised
to see an apparently approving reference to this very passage in the majority
judgment of Pigeon J., a reference made without further comment. 24
One commentator said that the "inescapable conclusion" from reading
Majewski is that "the designation of crimes as requiring, or not requiring
'specific intent' is based on no principle but on policy." 25 This conclusion
applies equally to Leary, and the conclusion is logically inevitable; since there
is no basic principle in our criminal law that could father the distinction, it
must therefore necessarily be ad hoc. As Dickson J.'s judgment states, from
general principles one would conclude that drunkenness is not affirmatively a
defence in any sense of the word; rather, it is merely a kind of evidence that
21Leary v. The Queen, supra note 1, at 57 (S.C.R.), 111 (D.L.R.), 481 (C.C.C.).
22 Gold, supra note 3, at 70 ff.
2 3 Williams, supra note 20, at 47-48.
24 See note 20, supra, and accompanying text.
2 5 Smith, supra note 12, at 378.
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may raise a reasonable doubt in the jury upon one of the essential elements
of the offence charged against the accused, the requisite mental state, thereby
resulting in an acquittal of the offence charged, although not necessarily of a
lesser included offence.
There is a certain irony in the conclusions reached in Leary, having
regard to the reverence with which the Beard rules are treated in that case,
because the conclusion in Leary either reduces the Beard judgment to mere
obiter, forcing one to conclude that Lord Birkenhead developed his lengthy
and comprehensive judgment in a case where it was unnecessary to do so, or,
is contrary to Beard itself. Beard was charged with the murder of a young
girl whom he killed in an endeavour to smother her cries while he was raping
her. Since he brought about the girl's death in the course of committing a
felony of violence against her, the felony-murder rule applied, and his defence
that he did not intend to kill her (based on his drunkenness) was disregarded.
As Lord Birkenhead pointed out, in such a case there is no question of intent
to kill; the only question is whether the accused intended to rape, and on the
facts Beard could not deny that he had had such an intention, whether or not
he was drunk. Accordingly, his conviction for murder was sustained.
In other words, Beard was itself all about drunkenness negativing the
intent to rape!
In Pigeon J.'s judgment in Leary,26 this point is dealt with merely by
quoting the following passage from Lord Russell in Majewski:
In my opinion these passages do not indicate an opinion that rape is a crime of
special intent. All that is meant is that conscious rape is required to supply "the
felonious intent which murder involves". For the crime of murder special or par-
ticular intent is always required for the necessary malice aforethought. This may
be intent to kill or intent to cause grievous bodily harm: or in a case such as
Beard of constructive malice, this required the special intent consciously to commit
the violent felony of rape in the course and furtherance of which the act of vio-
lence causing death took place. Beard, therefore, in my opinion does not suggest
that rape is a crime of special or particular intent.
Lord Russell says that in Beard's case the "special intent" [sic] was "con-
sciously to commit the violent felony of rape." However, this "does not sug-
gest that rape is a crime of special or particular intent." With respect, it seems
to suggest little else. Lord Russell seems to be saying that an "intent to rape"
is a specific intent when it constitutes the only mens rea of murder, being
constructive murder, since it is well established that murder is always a spe-
cific intent offence; but it is not so when only rape is charged. Perhaps we
may be grateful that Lord Russell did not begin to contemplate the other
logical possibility that some forms of murder may not require a specific intent!
In England, Majewski put an end to the hope that the "meaningless
verbiage" of specific intent would be "put aside," to repeat the commentator's
conclusion quoted earlier,27 and "first principles" would be restored. Leary
26 Leary v. The Queen, supra note 1, at 55 (S.C.R.), 110 (D.L.R.), 480 (C.C.C.).
27 See text accompanying note 13, supra.
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repeats the process in Canada. Leary, like Majewski, represents the victory of
policy over principle.
In Majewski, however, no one spoke on behalf of principle in the unani-
mous House of Lords. The difference in Leary is the lucid dissenting judgment
of Dickson J., a judgment described by one commentator as "superb."28
Whether this judgment ever prevails over that of the majority in Leary, only
the future will tell. For now, the law in Canada in this area appears to be
solidly based upon policy considerations.
2 8 Stuart, supra note 18, at 606.
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